World Order or Disorder
WE live in a world of grave uncertainty. Because we are confused by too much
volatile information, we rely on experts to interpret for us how to understand history
and how to read the future.

Former US Secretary of State and Harvard academic Dr Henry Kissinger is well
positioned to fill that role. His new book,
World Order: Reflections on the Character
of Nations and the Course of History
, is in my view, the definitive book on national
security, geopolitics and statecraft for the 21st century.

In 1972, US President Richard Nixon, with the advice of Kissinger, undertook a
masterstroke in 20th century diplomacy by opening up to China to counterbalance the
threat of the Soviet Union. Within two decades, the Soviet empire collapsed with the
fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. A quarter century later, the U.S.-China rapprochement
propelled China to become the second largest economy in the world, but the U.S.
now considers China a rival, creating Cold War version 2.0, with a strange mix of
competitors and allies.

World Order is an instant classic – a tour de force through diplomatic and imperial
history of how Rome, Britain and the United States rose to become No. 1. The United
States did so through superior geography and natural resources, technology and the
legacy of democratic rule of law forged from the ashes of European internecine wars.
It is the heir to the European imperial tradition, and defends it with the largest and
most sophisticated military in the world.

The North Atlantic alliance comprises the United States, Europe, Canada, Australia,
New Zealand and Japan. They account for 18% of global population, 38% of the
landmass, but actually the bulk of the oceans, because their colonial history enabled
the occupation of not only remote islands in the Pacific, Atlantic and Indian oceans,
but also the Artic and Antartic natural resources. In terms of real resources, the “sea-
grab” of the 19th century far outweighed the colonial “land-grab”.

But the unipolar situation is only temporary, because of the rise of the non-North
Atlantic economies in terms of population and GDP. Recognizing this, Kissinger
warns his countrymen that as the dominant super-power, the U.S. is forever
ambivalent as to its strategic choices. It can either impose its own moral values on the
rest of the world or play the balancing act between its enemies and friends, so as to
maintain its superior position as Global No. 1.

The U.S. has to choose between being principled (about its democratic ideals) or
being practical to follow the classic British skill of “divide and rule”. It cannot afford to
do both. By drawing the lines of “friend or foe” starkly in moral terms, the United
States is in danger of isolating itself, because its allies may not always agree with it
on every issue. For example, by helping to get rid of leaders such as Gaddafi in the
name of human rights, the U.S. allies opened up Libya to a situation of civil war and
total chaos.

However powerful the U.S. is, it cannot alone turn back the tides of change from
demographics, religion, globalization and technology.

The reality is that with the exception of the United States, which is open to
immigration and global talent, its strongest allies – Europe and Japan – are aging
fast. The 600 million in the North Atlantic alliance will have to confront in the 21st
century at least three waves of billion-class competition. Behind 1.3 billion Chinese
are 1.3 billion Indians and a further 1.6 billion of the Islamic faith from West Africa to
Indonesia.

Once these economies consume resources per capita like the average American or
European, the clash for resources will become inevitable.

As Kissinger pointed out, the dilemma is not just how to deal with conventional
warfare and nuclear arms race, but also how to cope with guerilla warfare, terrorism
and cyber-warfare. Realistically, America cannot single-handedly fight simultaneously
three fronts in Eastern Europe, turmoil in the Middle East and nuclear tensions in
East Pacific.

Global game

Kissinger is most prescient and insightful in looking at how technology has changed
the global game. The chapter “Technology, Equilibrium and Human Consciousness”
is zen-like in its brutally frank assessment of how the Internet of Things and
Everything has made the world simultaneously advanced, dynamic and yet fragile. A
single terrorist can access technology and knowhow that can unleash destructive
forces through cyberspace, biotechnology or drones. If the United States can use
drones to target terrorists, so can lone-wolf terrorists use micro-drones to target the
United States or any homeland.

The world is run today on the basis of nation states, but the system is being changed
by non-state players, such as IS and other movements that are re-writing the old
colonial boundaries by sheer force of arms. In order to maintain World Order, the
United States not only has to contend with demographics and technology, but also
the effects of global warming and climate change. If the Second World War was
fought over oil (Germany reaching for Romanian oil and Japan trying to access oil in
Burma and Indonesia), the Third World War will be about water and food insecurity.
First, the wars in Rwanda, Sudan, Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq stem partly from
water stress. Islam has spread fastest in failed states where current regimes no
longer have the capacity to provide security, jobs, food and water for the growing
population. Second, the clashes at borders with illegal migration are due to
population pressures as well as the search for jobs and opportunities. Just as
Hispanics move north illegally into the United States, economic refugees from North
Africa are moving into Europe, changing its demographic and political balance. That
migration will accelerate with climate change.

The old world order is built on nation states. But the new order is unclear, because
non-state players such as IS and Al-Qaeda do not necessary play by Westphalian
sovereign state rules.

This is a time for national and global leadership, at exactly the time when politics are
petty, parochial and pathetic. Wise statesmen like Kissinger deserve our respect
because he warns us that we need to have new lenses and new tools for new
challenges.

Andrew Sheng writes on global issues from an Asian perspective.

A version of this article appeared in The Star Online, 9 May 2015
Andrew Sheng
沈联涛
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Andrew Sheng
 
Distinguished Fellow
Asia Global Institute, The University of Hong
Kong